

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DOS, NSS, Review
Completed.

ACTION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *John H. Holdridge*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Ambassador Habib on
March 9, 1973 at 6:30 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Habib March 9 at 6:30 p.m. He is visiting Washington for a medical check-up (as you will recall, he had a heart attack about a year ago) and consultations.

Habib is here at a particularly useful time: we will be ready for an SRG meeting on our Korean policy NSSM in about another two to three weeks. (The Korean force modernization review will be ready somewhat later.) Also, you recently gave Ambassador Habib guidance on U. S. force levels in Korea and related matters.

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I will plan to sit in on the meeting.

Suggested Talking Points

- Ask Habib's appraisal of the South-North talks:
 - . What do the objectives of the two Koreas each appear to be now?
 - . Is the North's two-month delay in convening the Coordinating Committee meeting attributable to dissension within its leadership, or to differences with Peking? (The North did within the past few days notify the South that it was willing to meet later this month.)
 - . Was the shooting incident in the DMZ this week possible related to the delay?
 - . Is the North's frustration with Park's insistence on a step-by-step approach, putting the major political questions aside for the present, likely to incline the North to renew limited military and other pressures on Park?

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XGDS 5b(3) BYAUTH Mr. Kissinger

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. What are the relationships between President Park, CIA Director Yi Hu-rak, and Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil as regards the talks?

. To what extent does Park rely on U. S. support in carrying on these talks, and to what extent does he see the talks as a hedge against the possibility of a U. S. withdrawal or a deal with the PRC?

. What are Park's objectives in trying to establish contact with the PRC?

- How does Park assess U. S. intentions vis-a-vis the Peninsula at this point? How important was the U. S. factor in Park's decision to tighten his internal political system last fall? What would Park's reaction likely be if the U. S. were to begin a gradual step-by-step expansion of contacts with North Korea?

-- How does Habib assess Japan's position in and intentions toward South Korea at this point, and what role does Park want Japan to play there?

- What flexibility will the ROK be willing to show on the Korean question in next fall's U. N. General Assembly? Would it be willing to allow UNCURK to lapse quietly if the UNC could be preserved? Is it disposed to seek the North's agreement to forego debate on the question in the UNGA?

-- Ask Habib's appraisal of how Park's internal position stands in the wake of his extensive realignment of the political system since last October.

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING
25X1

DATE 01/29/73//029

SITUATION: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUTGOING

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION: 25X1

ANNOTATIONS:
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IMMEDIATEO 242118Z JAN 73 ZYH ZFF-4
FM WHITE HOUSE (SEOUL/WH20190) 25X1

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

S E C R E T [REDACTED] SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

WH20190 25X1

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. I KNOW THAT YOU AND OTHERS IN STATE AND DEFENSE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO VARIOUS STUDIES RELATING TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, I THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOREA AND ON THE 5-YEAR MODERNIZATION PLAN MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN YOUR CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS OPTIONS.

2. REGARDING THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, THE PRESIDENT HAS NO PLANS TO CARRY OUT ANY FURTHER TROOP REDUCTIONS FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. HE REMAINS CONSCIOUS OF THE NEAR-TRAUMA OUR PREVIOUS REDUCTION CAUSED IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ROKS, AND WANTS TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE QUESTION OF OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IS LOOKED AT VERY CAREFULLY IN THIS LIGHT TO ASSURE THAT WHATEVER WE DO DOES NOT GENERATE A GRAVE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN US ON THE PART OF THE ROK PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT.

3. IN THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT, THE 5-YEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ALSO RELATES VERY CLOSELY TO THIS ISSUE OF ROK CONFIDENCE AND US-ROK RELATIONS. HE RECOGNIZES THAT CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING MAY BE HARD TO GET, BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN THE ROK LEADERSHIP HE CONSIDERS THAT WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM WITH SUCH STRETCH-OUT AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO REACH THE \$1.5 BILLION LEVEL. THE ROKS CONSIDER THAT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

SCOWCROFT, HOWE, LORD, KENNEDY

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/29/73//029

SITUATION:

SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUTGOING

25X1

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THEY HAVE A COMMITMENT FROM US, AND SO DOES THE PRESIDENT. AS HE SEES IT, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE THEREFORE IS THE MIX OF GROUND FORCE, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS FOR A BALANCED DEFENSE. SOME ADJUSTMENTS CAN OF COURSE BE MADE HERE AS A RESULT OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM YOU AND GENERAL BENNETT, FROM STATE AND FROM DEFENSE.

4. ANY COMMENTS WHICH YOU WOULD CARE TO MAKE TO ME DIRECTLY WOULD BE VERY WELCOME. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACE OVER THE MATTER OF OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ROKS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ROK CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WENT INTO EFFECT, AND WILL LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR COUNSEL.

5. WARM REGARDS.

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